26-02-2022, 10:27 PM
Oh that's certainly part of the reason, dawg!
However, there are other aspects as well. Generational trauma regarding war, given that may of my age still know people who lived through the war ourselves, is part of the issue.
Another part, believe it or not, is Germany's earlier successes in dealing with the USSR, dating back to Konrad Adenauer getting the last 10,000 German PoWs back in 1955. Ever since Chancellor Willy Brandt started his "Ostpolitik" rapprochement with the USSR and Eastern Europe back in the mid 1960s, Germany has used a combination of back-channel diplomacy and economic & social engagement to deal with Russia. This allowed Germany to defuse a number of crises in the 1970s or 1980s that could have otherwise turned ugly and it was a major factor in the successful reunification of Germany. This policy allowed Germany to work with pretty much every Russian leader since Khrushchev, so when Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, it seemed like he would continue that pattern, and Putin was indeed very friendly with Germany in the beginning. I remember watching a speech of his in front of the Bundestag in the early 2000s where he talked, in fluent and almost accent-free German no less, about the cultural bonds between Russia and Germany. This is also the atmosphere in which the now so controversial Nordstream project was born, a series of pipelines that would help Russia get back on its feet economically and would lead to closer trade with Germany and the rest of Europe, integrating Russia into the continental political system after decades of isolation and decline.
Now, none of this is any excuse for Germany's inaction since the 2014 invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. That's where amongst other things the geriatric ossification of German politics, particularly during the latter half of the Merkel years, comes in. However, it hopefully clarifies where some of the initial reluctance comes from. If a policy has served you well since the 1960s, you're very hesitant about just throwing it out.
However, there are other aspects as well. Generational trauma regarding war, given that may of my age still know people who lived through the war ourselves, is part of the issue.
Another part, believe it or not, is Germany's earlier successes in dealing with the USSR, dating back to Konrad Adenauer getting the last 10,000 German PoWs back in 1955. Ever since Chancellor Willy Brandt started his "Ostpolitik" rapprochement with the USSR and Eastern Europe back in the mid 1960s, Germany has used a combination of back-channel diplomacy and economic & social engagement to deal with Russia. This allowed Germany to defuse a number of crises in the 1970s or 1980s that could have otherwise turned ugly and it was a major factor in the successful reunification of Germany. This policy allowed Germany to work with pretty much every Russian leader since Khrushchev, so when Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, it seemed like he would continue that pattern, and Putin was indeed very friendly with Germany in the beginning. I remember watching a speech of his in front of the Bundestag in the early 2000s where he talked, in fluent and almost accent-free German no less, about the cultural bonds between Russia and Germany. This is also the atmosphere in which the now so controversial Nordstream project was born, a series of pipelines that would help Russia get back on its feet economically and would lead to closer trade with Germany and the rest of Europe, integrating Russia into the continental political system after decades of isolation and decline.
Now, none of this is any excuse for Germany's inaction since the 2014 invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. That's where amongst other things the geriatric ossification of German politics, particularly during the latter half of the Merkel years, comes in. However, it hopefully clarifies where some of the initial reluctance comes from. If a policy has served you well since the 1960s, you're very hesitant about just throwing it out.
Money talks. Mine always says goodbye!